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Examining the extent of and drivers for materiality assessment disclosures in
sustainability reports
Abstract
Purpose: This paper evaluates the extent of materiality assessment disclosures in sustainability
reports and their determinants. The study examines the disclosure practices of listed companies
based in the member states of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf,
colloquially referred to as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Design/methodology: Firstly, the materiality assessment disclosures were scored through a
content analysis of sustainability reports published by listed GCC companies during a five-year
period from 2013 to 2017. Secondly, a fixed effect ordered logic regression was used to
examine the determinants of materiality assessment disclosures.
Findings: While sustainability reporting rates improved across the sample period, a significant
majority of listed GCC companies do not engage in sustainability reporting. The use of
internationally recognised standards has also declined. While reporters provide more
information on their materiality assessment, the number of sustainability reports that offer
information on how the reporter identifies material issues has declined. These trends potentially
indicate the existence of managerial capture. Materiality assessment disclosure scores are
positively influenced by higher financial performance (Return on Assets), lower leverage and
better corporate governance. However, company size and market-to-book ratio do not influence
materiality assessment disclosures.
Practical implications: The findings may prove useful to managers responsible for preparing
sustainability reports who can benefit from the examples of materiality assessment disclosures.
An evaluation of the materiality assessment should be included in the scope of assurance
engagements and practitioners can use the examples of best practice when evaluating
sustainability reports. Stock exchanges may consider developing improved corporate
governance guidelines as these will lead to materiality assessment disclosures.
Social implications: The findings may assist in improving sustainability reporting quality,
through better materiality assessment disclosures. This will allow corporate stakeholders to
evaluate the reporting entities underlying processes, which leads to transparency and corporate
accountability. Improved corporate sustainability reporting supports the GCC commitment to
implement the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and transition to
sustainable development.
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Originality: This study addresses the call for greater research examining materiality within a
sustainability reporting context. This is the first paper to examine sustainability reporting
quality in the GCC region, focusing particularly on materiality assessment disclosures.
Key terms: materiality assessment; sustainability reporting; corporate governance; managerial
capture; Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Article classification: Research paper
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1. Introduction
Organisations play a key role in supporting societies’ ambition of sustainable development
(Bebbington, 2001; Gray, 2010). To demonstrate their commitment to sustainability,
organisations undertake sustainability reporting, in which they provide stakeholders with
information on the social, environmental and economic impact of their operations1 (Global
Reporting Initiative, n.d.). While sustainability reporting is now a global norm (KPMG, 2017),
critics complain that sustainability reporting is subject to managerial capture (O’Dwyer, 2003;
Owen et al., 1997; Owen et al., 2000), whereby reporters primarily discuss positive
performance (good news) while providing little to no information on negative performance
(bad news) (Zaman et al., 2020). Such poor quality sustainability reports act as a façade hiding
corporate hypocrisy (Cho et al., 2015; Howard et al., 2019; Maroun, 2018) and thereby
preventing sustainability reporting from achieving its goal of promoting transparency and
corporate sustainability accountability (Adams, 2004, 2015; Adams & Larrinaga‐González,
2007; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Gray, 2010).
To reduce the likelihood of managerial capture and improve the quality of sustainability
reporting, international standard setters, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI),
recommend that reporters should undertake a materiality assessment to identify issues that are
material to the reporting entity and its stakeholders (Global Reporting Initiative, n.d.). This
would ensure that material issues are identified, and reporters publish high-quality
sustainability reports. In sustainability reporting, materiality is the principle that determines
which relevant topics are sufficiently important that it is essential to report on them (Global
Reporting Initiative, 2016, p. 10). A materiality assessment is a process of identifying
economic, social and environmental issues that are material to the company and its stakeholders
(Global Reporting Initiative, 2015; Jones et al., 2016; Lydenberg, 2012). Importantly, standard
setters and practitioners recommend that reporters disclose their materiality assessment within
their sustainability reports - that is, provide information on how they undertook their materiality
assessment (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013, 2016). This would allow report users to
understand and evaluate the process used by the reporter in identifying material issues and why
some material issues are discussed in the sustainability report while others are not. Report users
could also compare the process against the requirements of international standards and
disclosures made by other companies to evaluate whether the reporter is following best

1

Some organisations opt to publish stand-alone sustainability reports while others prefer to include information
on their sustainability performance in a single annual report. For the purpose of this study the term ‘sustainability
report’ is used for sustainability information, whether contained within a single annual report or a separate
sustainability report.
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practices.2 This would reduce the likelihood of managerial capture and improve the quality of
sustainability reports. Ultimately, this will lead to improved stakeholder confidence in
published sustainability reports and promote greater corporate transparency and accountability.
However, studies examining materiality within a sustainability reporting context remain scarce
(Unerman & Zappettini, 2014). Researchers have commented on the conceptualisation of
materiality in non-financial reporting (Eccles et al., 2012; Fasan & Mio, 2017; Lydenberg,
2012; Mio & Fasan, 2013). For example, Eccles et al. (2012) evaluate US companies’ climate
change-related disclosures in response to new reporting requirements issued by the US
Securities and Exchange Commission (effective since February 2010). Disappointed by the
quality of these disclosures, Eccles et al. (2012) suggest that regulators and standard setters
need to introduce sector-specific guidance on which sustainability indicators are material and
should be reported. Others have focused their attention on how the materiality assessment
should be undertaken. For example, Calabrese et al. (2015) offer insights into the use of
analytical tools for evaluating customer feedback on sustainability reports. Similarly, Calabrese
et al. (2016) suggest the use of an analytical model to help reporters evaluate stakeholder
perceptions on the relative importance (i.e. material versus not material) of GRI aspects and
indicators3. Hsu et al. (2013), using a case study methodology, develop a materiality assessment
model, based on stakeholder perceptions. Farooq and De Villiers (2019b) interview
sustainability reporting managers and present insights into five stages of the institutionalisation
of sustainability reporting (including the materiality assessment process) within reporting
organisations. However, none of these studies evaluate the extent of reporter’s materiality
assessment disclosures i.e. the information provided by the reporter on how they undertook
their materiality assessment. Exceptions include Jones et al. (2016), who critique the
materiality assessment disclosures contained within the 2015 sustainability reports published
by the top 10 UK retail companies. However, this study does not provide a comparative
analysis of the extent of materiality assessment disclosures across time, nor does it explore the
determinants of materiality assessment disclosures. Beske et al. (2020) examine the extent of
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This argument rests on the assumption that users have a basic understanding of sustainability reporting. However,
the same assumption is made in financial reporting, where users are assumed to have a reasonable understanding
of business, economics and accounting to be able to understand the information provided in a set of financial
statements. As sustainability reporting becomes more widespread it is reasonable to assume that users’
understanding of such reports (and their related standards) will also improve. Additionally, it is worth noting that
there is a risk that a reporter’s materiality assessment claims/disclosure are not reliable; i.e. what is disclosed does
not reflect what was done. However, the same risk exists in financial reporting and is addressed (with some
success) through the annual financial audit. Similarly, the growth of sustainability assurance (i.e. external
assurance of sustainability reports) is designed to improve the reliability of sustainability reports (Farooq and De
Villiers, 2017, 2018).
3
In their study Calabrese et al. (2016) engaged with internal stakeholders/managers to identify and prioritise
material issues.
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materiality assessment disclosures in a sample of German listed companies using a binary
scoring index. They find that reporters disclose limited information on their materiality
assessment. Using legitimacy theory, they argue that a materiality analysis can be strategically
misused to define sustainability report content without considering the interests of
stakeholders. They argue that managers must acknowledge the importance of materiality
assessment disclosures, as failure to do so would call into question the overall reliability of the
information presented. However, the study is limited to analysing the extent of materiality
assessment disclosures. They recommend that future researchers move beyond a binary index
to allow for a more granular analysis of disclosures.
Furthermore, while research into the sustainability disclosure practices of reporters based in
developed countries has improved in recent years, there remains a need for greater research
focusing on developing countries in the Middle East and Africa (Amran & Haniffa, 2011;
Beske et al., 2020; Gerged et al., 2018; Zaman et al., 2018). The Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) of the Middle East comprises of the states of Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Three reasons support
greater academic effort targeting the disclosure practices of companies based in this region.
First, the economic, political and social importance of the GCC region must be recognised. The
region has a significant global environmental footprint with implications for global warming
and climate change (WWF, 2012). Second, the GCC states have indicated their commitment
to the UN SDGs, e.g. the KSA’s ‘Vision for 2030’ which incorporates the UN SDGs. Academic
research focusing on this region has the potential to assist regulators, reporters and practitioners
in improving sustainability reporting so that can produce high-quality sustainability reporting
that promotes transparency and corporate accountability). Third, while sustainability reporting
rates in developed countries have increased dramatically in recent years (KPMG, 2015, 2017),
developing countries (in comparison to developed western states) are still relatively new to
sustainability reporting. Consequently, researchers will be able to identify greater variations in
disclosure quality when examining sustainability reports published by companies based in
these countries.
The few studies that have explored sustainability reporting amongst Middle Eastern nations
tend to focus on how much information is provided (Gerged et al., 2018). However, with the
introduction of GRI G4 in 2013, the emphasis has now shifted from providing more
information (as a trait of better-quality sustainability reports) to providing better disclosure
only on material issues (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013). Therefore, this study seeks to
address these gaps in the literature by addressing two research questions: (i) what is the extent
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of material assessment disclosures and (ii) what corporate characteristics (including corporate
financial performance, corporate leverage, corporate governance and company size) influence
materiality assessment disclosures scores?
To evaluate the extent of materiality assessment disclosures, a content analysis of sustainability
reports was carried out over a sample of 704 listed GCC companies for a five-year period (2013
to 2017). The determinants of materiality assessment disclosures were examined using a fixed
effect order logic regression analysis.
The study finds that while sustainability reporting rates in the GCC have increased, a significant
majority did not engage in sustainability reporting. For example, in 2017, 60% of listed GCC
companies did not engage in sustainability reporting. There is a decline in the use of the GRI
guidelines, with only 8.2% of sustainability reports referring to internationally recognised
standards. The number of sustainability reports containing information on the reporter’s
materiality assessment declined from 10.2% in 2013 to 8.6% in 2017. However, despite this
downward trend, materiality assessment disclosures improved in the region with the average
materiality assessment disclosure score moving from 2.39 in 2013 to 3.08 in 2017.
Nevertheless, overall findings reveal that listed GCC companies fail to inform their
stakeholders on the process they use for identifying material issues for inclusion within the
sustainability report. Arguably, by not providing this information, reporters are able to avoid
outside scrutiny over their underlying reporting processes and can maintain their control over
the sustainability reporting agenda, leaving the reporting process open to managerial capture.
Despite this general lack of transparency, there are GCC listed companies that voluntarily
disclose information on their materiality assessment. Regression analysis was used to find out
what corporate characteristics influence companies disclosing information on their materiality
assessment. Our regression results show that high financial performance (i.e. high Return on
Assets), lower corporate leverage, and better corporate governance (including board
independence) significantly increase corporate materiality assessment disclosure scores.
However, we found that company size and market-to-book ratio is not associated with
materiality assessment disclosures.
The study fills a gap in the literature by contributing to research on sustainability reporting
quality, focusing specifically on materiality assessment disclosures. First, we uncover the
relevant antecedents of materiality assessment disclosure scores that, despite their significance
in determining materiality assessment disclosures, were absent in prior studies. These
determinants are derived from the sustainability reporting/social and environmental accounting
literature as well as the broader corporate governance literature. Second, given the dearth of
7

studies examining sustainability reporting in the Middle East, this study offers a novel context
and assists in building our understanding of disclosures practices in the GCC region.
These findings may prove useful to practitioners responsible for preparing and assuring
sustainability reports – the sustainability reporting managers and sustainability assurance
providers. Sustainability reporting managers can benefit from the examples of best practice in
materiality assessment disclosures which can assist in improving the quality of their
disclosures. From a sustainability assurance perspective, an evaluation of a reporter’s
materiality assessment should be included within the scope of sustainability assurance
engagements. The examples of materiality assessment disclosures will assist assurance
practitioners in evaluating corporate sustainability reports.
The findings of this study have policy implications. Stock exchanges should consider
introducing tougher corporate governance requirements, as we found corporate governance
quality (board structures and use of international reporting standards) improves materiality
assessment disclosures. Improved materiality assessment disclosures have societal
implications as it allows corporate stakeholders to understand and evaluate the process used by
sustainability reporters in identifying material issues for reporting. Ultimately corporate
stakeholders will benefit from the likely reduction in managerial capture, improved
sustainability report quality and increased corporate transparency and accountability. These
developments have implications for the GCC states in supporting their goal of implementing
the UN SDGs and transitioning to a more sustainable growth path.
The remainder of this paper consists of a literature review (section two), theoretical framework
(section three), research method (section four), findings and analysis (section five), discussion
(section six) and conclusion (section seven).
2

Literature review

Materiality is a well-known and central concept in the accounting world (Fasan & Mio, 2017;
Mio & Fasan, 2013). Accountants use materiality to guide them in preparing financial
statements and financial auditors rely on materiality in planning and performing their audit.
However, there is no universally agreed upon definition for materiality4 (Eccles & Krzus, 2014;
Edgley, 2014). According to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), a subboard of the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation (IFRS Foundation),
4

As Edgley (2014) remarks, the lack of a definition does not prevent the term from achieving what it sets out to
achieve. Eccles and Krzus (2014) point out that the U.S. courts intentionally avoid providing any definition for
materiality, as they do for fraud. Instead what is material and what is immaterial is decided on a case by case basis
by considering both quantitative and qualitative information. Importantly, the process of determining materiality
must be made with complete clarity.
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“information is material if omitting it or misstating it could influence decisions that … users of
… financial reports make on the basis of those reports, which provide financial information
about a specific reporting entity” (IASB, 2018, p. 15). The International Standards on Auditing
(ISAs), published by the International Audit and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB),
describe materiality as “misstatements including omissions, are considered to be material if
they, individually or in the aggregate, could reasonably be expected to influence the economic
decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial statements” (IAASB, 2009, p. 314).
Thus, materiality acts as a threshold below which an item is considered immaterial (i.e. does
not influence the economic decisions of financial report users) and above which an item is
considered material (i.e. does influence the economic decisions of financial report users)
(Eccles & Krzus, 2014). As information can be material in nature and/or magnitude,
accountants must consider both qualitative and quantitative factors when making their
assessments. The IASB, in its 2018 Conceptual Framework, also states that materiality is an
“entity-specific” concept (IASB, 2018, p. 14), and therefore it cannot prescribe a single
threshold for materiality for use by all reporting entities; that is, what is material for one entity
may not be material for another.
2.1

Materiality in sustainability reporting

As is the case in the accounting world, there is no consensus on the definition of materiality
within sustainability reporting (Jones et al., 2016; KPMG, 2014). However, this is where the
similarity ends, as materiality in accounting represents a relatively narrow short-term financial
perspective drawn from a set of historical financial statements and underlying accounting
records (AccountAbility, 2013; Global Reporting Initiative, 2013), whereas materiality in
sustainability reporting draws on a broader range of stakeholders, incorporates both backward
and forward-looking dimensions, and integrates with the organisation’s overall strategy
(AccountAbility, 2013).
Responding to criticisms of promoting a tick-the-box approach to sustainability reporting
(Moneva et al., 2006), the GRI launched its G4 guidelines in 2013. The new guidelines
emphasised the importance of materiality and were designed to ensure that sustainability
reports are relevant to the information needs of stakeholders (Global Reporting Initiative,
2013). In defining materiality, the GRI explains that “the report should cover aspects that:
reflect the organization’s significant economic, environmental and social impacts; or
substantively influence the assessments and decisions of stakeholders” (Global Reporting
Initiative, 2016, p. 6). In 2016 the GRI launched a set of standards to replace G45 (applicable
5

The GRI G4 guidelines were applicable from 2015 until mid-2018 (GRI, 2013).
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from 1 July 2018). However, the principles outlined in G4 have been retained. Principles
around sustainability report content (what to report on) include (1) stakeholder inclusiveness
(identifying and responding to stakeholders’ interests); (2) sustainability context (reporting on
sustainability performance in relation to the broader local, regional and global sustainability
context); (3) materiality (ensuring disclosure on issues6 significant to the reporter and its
stakeholders); and (4) completeness (ensuring coverage of all material) (Global Reporting
Initiative, 2016).
2.2

Materiality assessment process

Materiality is often presented as a binary concept; an issue is either material (reported on) or
immaterial (not reported on) (Eccles & Krzus, 2014). However, undertaking a materiality
assessment is highly complex and inherently subjective. The principle of materiality in
AccountAbility, 2018 AP1100 states that “Materiality relates to identifying and prioritising the
most relevant sustainability topics, taking into account the effect each topic has on an
organisation and its stakeholders. A material topic is a topic that will substantively influence
and impact the assessments, decisions, actions and performance of an organisation and/or its
stakeholders in the short, medium and/or long term” (AccountAbility, 2018, p. 20). For the
purpose of this study, the term ‘materiality assessment’ is used. Such an assessment requires
reporters to consider a range of internal and external sources of information, and by engaging
with a wide range of stakeholders, to identify and evaluate material issues for reporting
(AccountAbility, 2008, 2011; Global Reporting Initiative, 2016). The materiality assessment
process is described in AccountAbility (2018) as determining the relevance and significance of
an issue to an organisation and its stakeholder.
KPMG (2014, p. 4) provides a seven-step approach to conducting a materiality assessment:
1.

Define scope and purpose: “Define what materiality means for your organization and

be clear about your objectives and audience.”
2.

Identify potential topics: “Create a long-list of potential material topics.”

3.

Categorize topics: “Refine the long-list of potential material topics by clustering them

into categories.”
4.

Gather information on impact and importance: “Explore each material topic in detail to

understand its relevance to the business and stakeholders.”

6

The GRI prefer to use the term aspect within their guidelines and list 4 types of economic aspects, 12 types of
environmental aspects and 4 sub-categories of social aspects (each sub-category then comprises of different types
of aspects).
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5.

Prioritize: “Prioritise material topics based on the strategic importance to the business,

importance to stakeholders and the social, economic and environmental impact of each topic
in the value chain.”
6.

Engage management: “Test the results of your materiality assessment with key internal

audiences to validate the outcome.”
7.

Seek stakeholder feedback: “Follow up with stakeholders to get feedback on the

material topics reported.”
The G4 guidelines explain that this process involves four steps (Global Reporting Initiative,
2013). Step one, identification, involves identifying material issues and is achieved by applying
the principles of sustainability context and stakeholder inclusiveness. Step two, prioritization,
requires the ranking of issues to assess which are the most significant and is achieved by
applying the principles of materiality and stakeholder inclusiveness. Step three, validation,
involves validating the results of step three and is achieved by applying the principles of
completeness and stakeholder inclusiveness. Finally, step four, review, involves undertaking a
post-publication review of the sustainability report with the aim of assessing whether the
principles of stakeholder inclusiveness and stakeholder engagement were applied and how to
refine step one in the next reporting cycle. Although this four-step process does not feature in
the new GRI standards, much of the content (especially the principles) is still the same. The
GRI notes that a reporter may identify numerous material issues. However, “[n]ot all material
topics are of equal importance, and the emphasis within a report is expected to reflect their
relative priority” (Global Reporting Initiative, 2016).
The actual responsibility for carrying out a materiality assessment is up to the reporting entity.
Specifically, it is the fiduciary duty of the board of directors (boards) to undertake a materiality
assessment (Eccles & Krzus, 2014). Furthermore, materiality is a social construct, or as Eccles
and Krzus (2014) describe it, materiality is a “firm-specific construct” (Eccles & Krzus, 2014,
p. 121). Thus, an issue is deemed to be material for the company and its stakeholders if the
board believes the issue to be material. However, Eccles and Krzus (2014) further argue that
boards should engage with stakeholders as these stakeholders hold influence over the reporter
and because there is a moral obligation on companies to provide information to society.
However, there is considerable variation in the way organisations undertake their materiality
assessment (Farooq & De Villiers, 2019b; Jones et al., 2016). This is because sustainability
reporting is still voluntary in most jurisdictions and reporters can choose whether to follow the
requirements of international sustainability reporting standards. As a result, reporters can
decide which stakeholders to engage with, how to engage with these stakeholders, the
11

importance assigned to different stakeholders and ultimately which issues are perceived to be
material (Adams & Frost, 2006; Kaur & Lodhia, 2018; Owen et al., 2001; Unerman, 2007;
Unerman, 2008).
Importantly, reporters are encouraged to provide information on how they undertook their
materiality assessment within their sustainability report. For example, the GRI states, “… the
reporting organization shall include an explanation of how the Materiality principle was
applied to identify material topics, including any assumptions made” (GRI, 2016, p. 34).
Similarly, (KPMG, 2014, p. 8) states, “[c]ompanies should make clear the process they have
used to assess materiality, how they have involved stakeholders in this process, and how they
have used the materiality assessment to inform,” Disclosure on the prioritisation of the material
issues identified often takes the form of what is referred to as a materiality matrix (Jones et al.,
2016). This matrix is often a two-dimensional graph that is used to rank material issues based
on, for example, the importance of the issue to the reporter (high vs low) and importance of the
issue to the stakeholder (high vs low). Given that a materiality assessment is an inherently
subjective exercise and given that ultimately the board decides what issues are material,
disclosing information on the materiality assessment can allow users to assess whether the
process adopted conforms to best practice and why certain issues were not reported on
(Bellantuono et al., 2016; Beske et al., 2020).
Despite the increasing emphasis placed by standard setters on materiality, research shows that
reporters do not perform well in this area (KPMG, 2013). For example, in a 2013 KPMG
survey, the world’s largest 250 companies scored only 66 out of 100 for their disclosure on
materiality. Similar results were noted by Jones et al. (2016) who examined the disclosure
practices of the top 10 UK retailers to evaluate how and to what extent these companies were
providing information on their materiality assessment process. They found that disclosure of
materiality assessment within sustainability reports was limited and the description of the
materiality assessment provided revealed that these reporters were adopting a variety of
different approaches to undertaking a materiality assessment. On stakeholder engagement, De
Villiers et al. (2014) analysed 23 sustainability reports published by Australian local councils
in 2009 and 2010 to assess the level and extent of disclosure over stakeholder engagement by
the reporter. Very little information was provided on stakeholder engagement. Importantly,
while reporters disclosed the issues or challenges, they faced in identifying and selecting
stakeholders, “… not one local council provided any information about the method of
stakeholder identification and selection” (p. 67).

12

3.

Theoretical framework

Accounting can be described as an exercise aimed at promoting transparency and
organisational accountability (Bebbington, 2001). Sustainability accounting practices, such as
sustainability reporting, are designed to provide information on organisations sustainability
performance to a broader range of stakeholders (Deegan, 2013; Gray, 2006; Hopwood et al.,
2010; Ong et al., 2016; Unerman & Chapman, 2014) and in doing so would “assist in liberating
and empowering the wider society” (O’Dwyer, 2003, p. 524). However, critics argue that
instead of promoting transparency and organisational accountability leading to change,
sustainability reporting (and sustainability accounting technologies in general) is subject to
managerial capture (Owen et al., 1997; Owen et al., 2000) and is used to preserve the status
quo (O’Dwyer, 2003). A similar theoretical lens is used by Michelon et al., (2015) who
examine the quality of sustainability reports published by listed UK companies.
Managerial capture, in the context of sustainability accounting, is described as a phenomenon
whereby organisational managers control the discourse over what sustainability is and direct
the conversation in a manner that promotes their interest while frustrating efforts to achieve
radical change (Farooq & De Villiers, 2019b; O’Dwyer, 2003). Managers control the reporting
process with the aim of using their sustainability reports to present a positive image of the
organisation, thereby maintaining the status quo and avoiding any real transparency and
corporate accountability. Researchers who examine the quality of sustainability reports find
that most sustainability reports resemble public relations or marketing documents which
present the reporting entities’ achievements (the good news/positive performance) while
providing little to no information on material issues - thereby conveniently excluding any
discussion over material bad news (the negative performance/impacts) (Unerman & Chapman,
2014). Researchers conclude that these poor-quality sustainability reports fail to promote
transparency and accountability (Bebbington & Gray, 2001; Gray, 1996, 2006, 2010). Instead,
managers use sustainability reports as a corporate veil, concealing the true impact of their
business operations (Hopwood, 2009). In this way, sustainability reports mislead
organisational stakeholders (Deegan & Rankin, 1996) and are harmful to societal goals of
promoting sustainable development (Deegan, 2002).
The recommendations of standard setters (such as the GRI) for materiality assessment
disclosure potentially offers a way to address the issue of managerial capture and promote highquality sustainability reporting. It does so by allowing stakeholders to evaluate for themselves
the process used by the reporter in identifying material issues and compare it with the
requirements of international sustainability reporting standards. This opens the company’s
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sustainability reporting processes to outside scrutiny and provides stakeholders with an
opportunity to critique the materiality assessment to ensure it conforms to international best
practice. While not a panacea for managerial capture, this does have the potential to reduce the
issue and lead to higher quality sustainability reporting.
3.1 Determinants of materiality assessment disclosures
Despite growing emphasis from global standard setters for companies to adopt materiality in
their sustainability reports to improve sustainability reporting quality, the level of transparency
in sustainability reporting reports among GCC countries remains low (KPMG, 2017). This low
level of transparency in a contextual setting where sustainability reporting is voluntary,
highlights the need to identify the corporate characteristics that lead some companies to
disclose information on their materiality assessment. In this regard, Gerwanski et al. (2019)
examine the determinants of materiality assessment disclosure quality in integrated reporting
in a sample of European and South African companies. They find that corporate governance
quality (gender diversity and assurance) and the learning affect positively influence materiality
assessment score/quality. However, integrated report readability, listing status and earnings
management do not have influence materiality assessment disclosures. In a review of 178
articles on sustainability reporting, Hahn and Kühnen (2013) found that the most frequently
investigated determinants of the extent and quality of sustainability reporting are: corporate
financial performance, corporate leverage, corporate governance quality and corporate size.
Therefore, we use these characteristics to draw the study’s hypotheses.
3.1.1 Corporate financial performance and materiality disclosure
Prior literature linking corporate financial performance with sustainability reporting quality has
largely failed to find any conclusive results (Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). For instance, some
researchers argue that poor financial performance (e.g. low profitability) makes it difficult for
companies to engage in costly and potentially risky and extensive high quality/transparent
sustainability reporting (Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Stanny & Ely, 2008). Others, however,
point out that sustainability reporting, subject to managerial capture, assists companies in
securing legitimacy amongst both stakeholders and providers of capital (creditors) (Haniffa &
Cooke, 2005). Thus, empirical research on financial performance as a determinant of the extent
and quality of sustainability reporting provides mixed results (Hahn & Kühnen, 2013).
However, Khan et al. (2016) find that a significant number of these studies fail to consider
materiality in their analysis. Building on these insights, we argue that managers working in
companies with better financial performance, reflecting better management practices,
potentially have less need for undertaking managerial capture. Hence, managers of high
14

performing companies will enhance their non-financial information flows by incorporating
materiality assessment disclosures into their sustainability reports. In line with Hahn and
Kühnen (2013), we selected two measures of corporate financial performance: profitability
(Return on Assets), and market performance (market-to-book ratio). We expect a significant
positive association of corporate profitability and market performance with materiality
assessment disclosure scores. Taken altogether we aim to test the following hypothesis:
H1: Corporate financial performance influences the extent of materiality assessment
disclosure amongst GCC listed companies.
3.1.2 Corporate leverage and materiality assessment disclosure
Researchers have examined the relationship between corporate leverage and the extent of
voluntary sustainability reporting. The findings in this literature show mixed results with some
researchers documenting a positive relationship (Barako et al., 2006; De Beelde & Tuybens,
2015), while others finding a negative relationship (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Cormier &
Magnan, 2003) or no relationship (Clarkson et al., 2011; Kent & Monem, 2008; Stanny & Ely,
2008) between these two variables. Researchers offer differing explanations for these results.
Researchers that note a positive relationship explain that companies with higher leverage will
undertake greater disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and lower the cost of capital
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Further, companies with higher gearing levels are more likely to
provide higher levels of sustainability disclosures in an attempt to negotiate better credit terms.
Also, high leverage companies need to demonstrate compliance with debt covenants and will
do so by providing more information (Lim et al., 2020). Finally, Haniffa and Cooke (2005),
using a legitimacy lens, argue that by providing sustainability information, companies can
secure legitimacy from creditors and shareholders. Studies which find a negative relationship
or no relationship argue that higher leverage companies are financially burdened and therefore
cannot afford the cost of sustainability reporting or the reputational and legal costs associated
with disclosing potentially damaging information (Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Stanny & Ely,
2008).
However, there is a dearth of studies examining the relationship between leverage and
sustainability reporting quality (Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). For example, Clarkson et al. (2008),
using a sample of 191 US companies found a significant positive association between leverage
and environmental disclosure quality. However, (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006) using a sample of
447 UK companies found that a higher level of leverage decreases the quality of environmental
disclosures. Thus, this study proposes the following hypothesis:
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H2: Corporate leverage influences the extent of materiality assessment disclosure amongst
GCC listed companies.
3.1.3 Corporate governance and materiality disclosure
The impact of good corporate governance on the quality of financial reporting has been well
documented in the literature. In this manner, researchers have identified a number of factors
that are associated with disclosure quality including: the board of directors (Bananuka, Night,
et al., 2019; Bananuka, Tumwebaze, et al., 2019; Nalukenge, 2020), audit committee
(Bananuka, Kadaali, et al., 2019; Bananuka et al., 2018), and corporate governance quality
(Nalukenge et al., 2018). Extending this work, academics have also explored the impact of
good governance on sustainability reporting quality (Zaman, Nadeem, et al., 2020).
Researchers have found that corporate governance is a significant determinant of the extent of
sustainability reporting (Jain & Jamali, 2016) and has the power and capacity to influence
organisational decisions relating to materiality assessment disclosures. Despite its significance
and importance, the influence of corporate governance structures on the quality and extent of
sustainability reporting has received relatively little academic attention (Hahn & Kühnen,
2013). The limited work in this area indicates that the presence of independent directors on
corporate boards has an influence the quality and extent of sustainability reporting. Independent
or non-executive directors are appointed to represent a broader group of stakeholders and
therefore put pressure on boards to adopt corporate sustainability (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1995).
However, the impact of independent directors on the extent and quality of sustainability
reporting provides mixed results. For example, while Prado‐Lorenzo et al. (2009) find that
independent directors influence the nature and extent of sustainability reporting, others argue
that non-executive directors do not have a significant influence on sustainability reporting
(Fuente et al., 2017; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005).
In the context of materiality assessment disclosures, we expect that companies with better
corporate governance will engage in better sustainability reporting, that is, provide more
extensive disclosures on their materiality assessment. Such companies are characterised by
effective monitoring of management by the board and are likely to exhibit lower instances of
managerial capture. For instance, prior literature indicates that high board monitoring leads to
lower managerial entrenchment and high corporate transparency (Jain and Zaman, 2020;
Zaman et al., 2018). Conversely, managers in companies characterised by poor corporate
governance are more likely to engage in managerial capture and thus withhold or limit their
materiality assessment disclosures, thereby maintaining the status quo and avoiding any real
transparency and corporate accountability. We followed the prior literature and measured
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corporate governance via two measures: (i) corporate governance quality score and (ii) board
independence (Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). We expect that low corporate governance quality and
a low number of independent directors may increase managerial capture and reduce the extent
of materiality assessment disclosures.
H3: Corporate governance is associated with the extent of materiality assessment disclosures
amongst GCC listed companies.
3.1.4 Company size and materiality disclosure
In terms of corporate size, researchers have found that larger companies (size measured using
a range of financial indicators including total assets and revenue) are more visible and their
practices attract greater stakeholder attention (Fortanier et al., 2011; Gallo & Christensen,
2011). Thus, larger companies are more likely to increase the extent and quality of their
sustainability reporting than smaller ones. It can also be argued that larger companies have the
financial resources necessary to undertake expensive sustainability reporting. Larger
companies can also absorb potential costs associated with information transparency (i.e.
reputational and legal costs and risks) (Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005;
Kent & Monem, 2008). However, Hahn and Kühnen (2013) note that empirical results in this
area are mixed.
However, the size of a reporter poses a unique challenge when drawing causal inferences with
materiality assessment disclosures. Prior studies have found that company size does not
influence the extent of sustainability reporting quality (Ettredge et al., 2011; Vormedal & Ruud,
2009). However, large companies do attract greater media and regulatory scrutiny and therefore
it is plausible to assume that managers in large companies, attempting to protect corporate
reputation and to avoid regulatory costs, potentially engage in greater managerial capture and
thereby avoid disclosing information on their materiality assessment (Zaman et al., 2018).
However, it can also be argued that large companies are accountable to a diverse group of
stakeholders to whom they need to justify their reporting decisions, such as, why certain issues
were deemed material while others were not. By providing information on their materiality
assessment, companies can address stakeholder suspicions around a lack of transparency
(Global Reporting Initiative, 2013; KPMG, 2015, 2017). Based on these arguments, we predict
that company size is an important determinant for the extent of materiality assessment
disclosures.
H4: Corporate size influences the extent of materiality assessment disclosures amongst GCC
listed companies.
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4. Research method
This section presents the research method used to address the research questions and discusses
the method used to collect and analyse the data.
4.1

The Gulf Cooperation Council

The study examines the sustainability reports published by listed GCC companies. The GCC
comprises “Arab Muslim majority” countries (Gerged et al., 2018, p. 573). The combined
population of the region was approximately 54 million in 2016 (GCC-STAT, n.d.). The GCC
states are one of the largest oil and gas exporters in the world (Statista, n.d.). Income from these
exports drives the GCC economies, which are ranked amongst the world’s richest nations
(World Factbook, n.d.). This wealth translates into a high demand for carbon-intensive goods
and services. The largest economy in the GCC is that of KSA with a GDP of 654 billion USD
in 2015 (The World Bank, n.d.). This is followed by the UAE (USD 358 billion), Qatar (USD
162 billion), Kuwait (USD 115 billion), Oman (USD 69 billion) and Bahrain (USD 31 billion).
In terms of GDP per capita, Qatar leads the GCC with a GDP per capita in 2017 of USD
124,500, followed by the UAE (USD 67,700), Kuwait (USD 66,200), KSA (USD 54,800),
Bahrain (USD 48,500) and Oman (USD 45,200) (The World Bank, n.d.).
Research shows that a culture of corporate secrecy is attributed to the Middle East (Leigh,
2011). The lack of corporate transparency is attributed to macro/societal and
micro/organisational level characteristics. At a macro-level institutional, “the long period of
Ottoman dominance of the region that led to the establishment of a secretive and arbitrary
bureaucracy unchecked by any democratically representative institutions may have contributed
to this lack of transparency (Leigh, 2011, p. 154). [Further], state-run companies and familyowned businesses (including large conglomerates) are lacking in transparency (Leigh, 2011).
In addition, financial markets and corporate governance arrangements remain underdeveloped
(Jamali, Jain, Samara, Zoghbi, 2020).
The governments of the GCC have expressed their commitment to achieving the UN SDGs.
For example, the KSA’s Voluntary National Review to the 2018 United Nations High-Level
Political Forum on Sustainable Development is the Kingdom’s first attempt to conduct a
comprehensive review of the status of the SDGs, their alignment with ‘Vision for 2030’, and
the actions taken by national entities including the government sector, the private sector, and
non-government organizations to fulfil the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Despite
this, there remains a dearth of literature examining sustainability reporting practices in the
GCC.
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4.2

Sample selection and data collection

To address the research objectives, we focused on listed companies because these are more
likely to engage in sustainability reporting and publish their sustainability reports, which could
be accessed from their websites. Our sample includes companies from all industries7. To
identify listed GCC companies we visited the websites of stock exchanges based in the six
GCC states. Of these six GCC states, the UAE consists of seven states of which two have stock
exchanges of their own – Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Thus, a total of seven stock exchanges were
identified, including: Tadawul (KSA), Muscat Securities Market (Oman), Bahrain Bourse
(Bahrain), Qatar Stock Exchange (Qatar), Boursa Kuwait (Kuwait), Dubai Financial Market
(Dubai) and Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (Abu Dhabi). From the websites of these seven
stock exchanges, we developed a list of 704 companies. These 704 companies’ sustainability
reporting practices were analysed over a five-year period, yielding a total of 3,520 firm-year
observations.
Subsequently, the websites of each company were visited to identify sustainability reports
published during the five years from 2013 to 2017. Our sample starts in 2013 due to the
availability of annual reports for GCC listed companies. These reports are identified by
different names such as: sustainability report, corporate responsibility or corporate social
responsibility report and social and environmental report. If a sustainability report was not
published, then the company’s annual report was analysed to identify potential sustainability
disclosures made therein (De Villiers & Marques, 2016). This was done by reading the table
of contents and by conducting a word search (keywords included sustainability, corporate
social responsibility, social responsibility or environmental responsibility, Environment, Social
and Governance (ESG), corporate philanthropy, charity, and corporate donation). Of note, for
robustness, all of the reports in PDF format (except for a few which were in JPEG format) were
imported to NVivo software for a word query based on a pre-defined search string and found
qualitatively similar results.
As a result of this exercise, we found that 52% of listed GCC companies issued either a set of
audited financial statements or a brief annual report (i.e. containing the board and CEO’s
statements, minutes of the annual general meeting and audited financial statements) and 16%
provided no report. Thus, only 32% of the listed companies published a sustainability report.
These consisted of stand-alone sustainability reports (4%) and sustainability information
contained within a single annual report (28%). Hence, a total of 1,147 sustainability reports

7

Our industry classification is based on Standard Industry Classification (SIC) available at https://siccode.com/
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(out of 3,520 reports) published during the five years from 2013 to 2017 were identified (Table
1).
Insert Table 1 about here
We acknowledge two limitations to our data collection. First, sustainability reports published
by companies delisted before 2017 were not included in the analysis. Second, we assumed that
all companies identified in 2017 had been listed since 2013 and therefore should have been
publishing a sustainability report in each of the five years from 2013 to 2017. Despite these
limitations, we believe that this study does achieve its objectives of providing an overview of
the comprehensiveness of materiality assessment disclosures provided by these companies
during the period of analysis.
4.3

Data analysis

The identified sustainability reports were analysed using the technique of content analysis
(Krippendorff, 2004). This technique has been extensively used in literature to analyse
published sustainability reports (Belal, 2002; Bradley & Botchway, 2018; Haque & Deegan,
2010; Islam & Deegan, 2008). Guthrie et al. (2004, p. 287) define content analysis “[a]s a
technique for gathering data, it involves codifying qualitative and quantitative information into
pre‐defined categories to derive patterns in the presentation and reporting of information. The
content analysis seeks to analyse published information systematically, objectively and
reliably.” This makes content analysis a particularly effective tool for analysing large sets of
data, thereby facilitating both a comparative and longitudinal analysis.
Content analysis can be used to count the frequency of occurrence of certain disclosure items
(Kamal & Deegan, 2013) or to assess the extent of occurrence of certain disclosure items by
counting words or sentences (Hackston & Milne, 1996) or to evaluate disclosure by scoring
disclosure items against a scoring index (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006). This study uses
content analysis to evaluate disclosure by scoring materiality assessment disclosures from zero
(no information provided) to five (comprehensive disclosure).
Score 0: A score of zero is allocated to those reporters who do not refer to a materiality
assessment. In such cases, sustainability report users: (1) are not made aware of the concept of
materiality assessment (the underlying process which determines the content of sustainability
reports); (2) do not know if a materiality assessment was undertaken; and (3) if a materiality
assessment was undertaken, do not know whether the process adopted meets the requirements
of internationally recognised standards and agreed-upon best practice in sustainability
reporting (see Appendix A1 for example).
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Score 1: A score of one is allocated to those reporters who claim to have undertaken a
materiality assessment but do not provide any information on the steps undertaken in their
assessment. These reporters score a point because they at least create an awareness of the
concept of a materiality assessment (a process underlying the sustainability report) amongst
report users and potentially open themselves up to demands for more comprehensive reporting
in the future. However, the remaining two limitations discussed for zero score reporters remain
unaddressed (see Appendix A1 for example).
Score 2: A score of two is allocated to those reporters who provide limited information on how
the materiality assessment was undertaken. The term ‘limited’ refers to reports that offer a brief
commentary on some (or all) of the steps undertaken by the reporter in identifying material
issues. However, no materiality matrix is provided to sustainability report users. A consequence
of providing limited disclosure is that sustainability report users lack a clear and comprehensive
understanding of how the reporter undertook the materiality assessment to prepare its
sustainability report in that given year, and whether the process adopted meets internationally
recognised standards. The lack of a materiality matrix means that users are unable to understand
how (i.e. the basis or criteria used) issues, once identified, were prioritized into the material
and non-material (i.e. excluded from the sustainability report) issues.
In scoring disclosures, we do not use any single benchmark (e.g. the GRI). We recognise that
while the GRI outlines a four-step approach, other experts such as KPMG present a seven-step
model (see Section 2.2). These differences represent variations in practice, which are to be
expected given that materiality - and how it should be reviewed; i.e. a materiality assessment is a relatively new and evolving concept in the field of sustainability reporting. Instead, we
focus on evaluating the comprehensiveness of materiality assessment disclosures provided by
the reporters and assessing to what extent these disclosures satisfy the information needs of
sustainability report users (see Appendix A1 for example).
Score 3: A score of three is allocated to those reporters who provide limited information on
their materiality assessment. However, in comparison to the previous group of reporters, these
companies include a materiality matrix in their disclosure. The matrix provides a visual
summary of the prioritisation of issues (and the criteria used) by the reporter (Global Reporting
Initiative, 2015). Thus, while sustainability report users lack a detailed and comprehensive
understanding of the materiality assessment, they can assess how identified issues were
prioritised into material and non-material disclosures (see Appendix A1 for example).
Score 4: A score of four is allocated to those reporters who provide a comprehensive disclosure
on their materiality assessment but fail to provide a materiality matrix. The term
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“comprehensive disclosure” refers to providing a clear and complete presentation of the
materiality assessment. The disclosure provided should allow users to understand the various
steps adopted by the reporter and to evaluate whether these steps are suitable and meet the
requirements of internationally recognised standards and agreed-upon best practice in
sustainability reporting (see Appendix A1 for example).
Score 5: A score of five is allocated to those reporters who provide comprehensive disclosure
on their materiality assessment as well as providing users with a materiality matrix8. Table 2
provides a summary of the scores (see Appendix A1 for example).
Insert Table 2 about here
We recognize the subjectivity inherent in differentiating between limited and comprehensive
disclosures. We addressed this by providing examples of disclosures with scores from one to
five as presented in Appendix A. This allows the reader to gain a better understanding of how
limited disclosure compares against comprehensive disclosure. Also, our approach is based on
the recommendations of Beske et al. (2020) who argue in favour of using ranking indexing to
analyse materiality assessment disclosure quality. Further, we argue that reporters have a range
of standards and frameworks to assist them in undertaking a materiality assessment and that
our index is broadly based on the recommendations of the GRI which is the most popular
sustainability reporting standards used across the world (KPMG, 2017).
The identified sustainability reports were analysed to evaluate the comprehensiveness of
materiality assessment disclosures. To do this, we first identified materiality assessment
disclosures provided in the sustainability reports. This was done by searching for keywords
appearing in the PDF file (e.g. material, materiality, materiality assessment, materiality
exercise, materiality process, materiality approach, materiality analysis, materiality
determination, stakeholder engagement, materiality matrix, and so on.) and manual reading of
JPEG format sustainability reports. If none of these words appeared in the search, the
sustainability report was reviewed to identify potential sections that would provide disclosure
on the reporter’s materiality assessment. The identified disclosures were then scored, and the
Excel worksheet was updated. If no reference was made to materiality assessment, then the
reporter was allocated a score of zero. A score of one to five was allocated based on the judged
disclosure over materiality.

8

There is a risk that some reporters may claim to have undertaken a comprehensive assessment but, may have
only undertaken a loose informal assessment. However, with increasing trends in sustainability assurance (Farooq
and De Villiers, 2018, 2019b; KPMG, 2017), this risk is mitigated (to an extent) if an external sustainability
assurance provider reviews or verifies the reporter’s claims and disclosures on how the materiality assessment
was undertaken.
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To maintain the reliability of the coding process, one of the authors recorded the results of two
randomly chosen reports on a separate Excel sheet. Thereafter, the lead author of the study
independently repeated the same process. We then applied the K-alpha test to check the coding
reliability (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007; Krippendorff, 2018). The K-alpha score was 0.87
which is well above the recommended score of 0.80 (Krippendorff, 2018). Further discussion
between the authors clarified the disagreement and the agreed coding/score were carried out
on the remaining reports. This ensured that there was a consensus amongst the research team
on the scores allocated (De Villiers & Alexander, 2014). Of note, the coding/scoring of
sustainability reports containing materiality assessment disclosures was undertaken by one
researcher and the work was checked by the other two researchers. The detailed examples of
disclosure scores are provided in Appendix A of this study.
4.3.1 Determinants of materiality disclosure
To estimate the company-level characteristics on materiality disclosure, we estimated Equation
1 using fixed-effect ordered logit regression. Fixed effects ordered logit model allows
researchers with panel data and an ordinal dependent variable (i.e. materiality assessment
disclosure is 0 to 5) to control time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (Baetschmann et al.,
2015). We also used the Poisson regression as an alternative estimation because of the nature
of our dependent variables (with count 0 to 5).
𝑛

𝑚

𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜑0 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘 𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑗=1

(Equation 1)

𝑘=1

Where i represents the company and t represents time (year); 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑖,𝑡 represents
the materiality assessment disclosure score for “𝑖” company at year “𝑡” year (which is manually
developed in this study); 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 represents the four sets of independent variables for a company
i at year t; (i) Corporate Financial Performance measured Return on Asset (ROA) and marketto-book value (MTB), (ii) Corporate Leverage measured as total debt to total equity, (iii)
Corporate Governance Quality captured as the number of independent board directors and
Thomson Reuters Eikon CG quality score and (iv) Company Size captured as the natural
logarithm of total asset. 𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 represents the macroeconomic level control variables to limit the
countries' effect. These variables are taken from World Bank Governance Indicators Database
and include Voice and Accountability Index, Regulatory Quality, GDP and GDP growth (see
Appendix A2 for variables details).
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5. Findings and analysis
This section presents the findings from the study. The analysis is organised into three parts.
The first provides an overview of sustainability reporting rates among listed GCC companies.
The second evaluates the comprehensiveness of materiality assessment disclosures. The third
provides examples of materiality assessment disclosures scored from one to five.
5.1 Overview of sustainability reporting rates
At a regional level, the analysis reveals an increasing trend in sustainability reporting over the
five years. The study found that 40% of listed GCC companies engaged in sustainability
reporting in 2017 (compared to 25% in 2013). This trend reflects regional regulatory efforts to
promote sustainability. For instance, the launch of the Middle East Sustainable Investment
Forum (MESIF)9 by the Qatar Stock Exchange in 2017, the introduction of ‘The Pearl Rating
System’ for Estidama10 by the Abu Dubai government with the aim of addressing sustainability
challenges in construction projects, and KSA’s commitment to implementing UN sustainable
development goals11 have encouraged companies operating in the region to demonstrate their
efforts towards promoting sustainability through the publication of sustainability reports.
The results reported in Table 3 indicate the highest sustainability reporting rates were observed
in Bahrain and Qatar, where 52% of listed companies published a sustainability report in 2017
(up from 39% and 41% in 2013 respectively). This was followed by KSA, where disclosure
rates were 43% in 2017 (up from 31% in 2013). The success of Bahrain and Qatar is led by
government initiatives for sustainability development. For instance, the Bahrain government is
engaged in efforts to wean the economy away from oil exports – making it a regional pioneer
in economic diversification. Due to these diversification initiatives, the oil and gas sector in
Bahrain accounted for 19% of GDP in 2017 compared with 43.6% in 200012. Similarly, the
Qatar Stock Exchange is working to promote responsible investment (e.g. Middle East
Sustainable Investment Forum), prompting listed companies to report sustainability
information. The lowest sustainability reporting rates were observed in Oman, Kuwait, Dubai
and Abu Dhabi, where only 34%, 36%, 36% and 37% of listed companies published a
sustainability report in 2017 (up from 22%, 16%, 20% and 26% respectively in 2013) (See
Table 3). The lower rates of disclosures are not surprising as sustainability reporting remains
a largely voluntary exercise. Thus, while disclosure rates have improved over time, a

9

https://sustainabilityexcellence.com/sustainability-excellence-launches-the-middle-east-sustainableinvestment-forum/
10
Estidama is Arabic for sustainability:https://www.upc.gov.ae/-/media/files/upc/media/prdm/prrs_v1.ashx.
11
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/20230SDGs_English_Report972018_FINAL.pdf
12
https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/notes_internacionals/n1_189/bahrain_s_econom
y_oil_prices_economic_diversification_saudi_support_and_political_uncertainties
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significant majority of listed entities in the GCC fail to provide their stakeholders with
information on their sustainability performance.
Insert Table 3 about here
The highest sustainability reporting rates were observed for companies operating in the
transportation and public utilities sector (see Table 4), which accounted for 66% of the
sustainability reports published in 2017 (up from 59% in 2013). This was followed by the
finance, insurance and real estate sector, where disclosure rates rose from 28% in 2013 to 42%
in 2017. Services and manufacturing companies accounted for 38% and 36% of sustainability
reports published in 2017, while the lowest disclosure rates in 2017 were observed to be in the
retail trade, mining and construction sectors with 17%, 26% and 29% of companies publishing
a sustainability report, respectively.
Insert table 4 about here
5.2

GRI adoption rates

At a regional level, the analysis indicates a decline in GRI adoption rates from 12% of
sustainability reporters referring to the GRI in 2013 to just 8% in 2017. At a country level, the
highest adoption rates were found among listed companies in Qatar, with 16.7% of
sustainability reporters making some reference to the GRI in 2017 (Panel A of Table 5). The
lowest adoption rates were amongst listed companies in Kuwait at 3.1%. GRI adoption rates
increased in Bahrain, Qatar and KSA while Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Kuwait and Oman experienced
a decline during the five years of analysis.
Insert Table 5 about here
5.3

Materiality assessment disclosure rates and scores

At a regional level, the analysis indicates a decline in the number of sustainability reports
containing information on materiality assessment (from 10.2% in 2013 to 8.6% in 2017) among
the listed GCC companies). At a country level, the analysis shows that the highest disclosure
rates were among listed companies in Qatar (12.5% in 2017) while the lowest disclosure rates
were observed among listed companies based in Kuwait (3.1% in 2017) (Panel B of Table 5).
In terms of materiality assessment scores, the analysis shows that at a regional level a slight
improvement in the comprehensiveness of materiality assessment disclosures was noted, with
materiality assessment scores increasing from 2.39 in 2013 to 3.08 in 2017. At a country level,
listed companies based in Abu Dhabi and Oman both scored 4.33 in 2017, moving up from
2.33 and 2.5 respectively in 2013 (Panel C of Table 5). Sustainability reporters based in Qatar,
Bahrain and Kuwait scored 3.67, 3 and 3 respectively in 2017 (up from 2, 2 and 2.5 respectively
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in 2013). In comparison, the lowest scores were awarded to listed companies based in Dubai
and KSA, where the average materiality assessment scores in 2017 were 2.67 (2.33 in 2015)
and 2.5 (2.35 in 2013).
5.4 Determinants of materiality assessment disclosure
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in our study. Our dependent
variable’s mean value (1.486) is on the lower side, indicating poor quality of materiality
assessment disclosure across our sample companies. The companies in our sample have a
decent size with a mean value of 22.5. In terms of performance variables, the results show
above average (62.7%) debt in the capital structure with an average profit (Return on Assets)
of 12.9%. With an average MTB of 1.660, 23.4% of our sample companies lack independent
board structures. This trend can be attributed to the prevalence of kinship type culture in the
Middle East. However, overall, we found on average CG quality disclosure across our sample
period is 62 %. The macro-control variables indicate a lack of voice freedom (15.4%) with
above-average regulatory quality (68%) and lower economic growth (2.9%).
Insert Table 6 about here
Table 7 results report the pairwise correlation coefficient for explanatory variables and control
variables. The results of the Pearson coefficient are well below the threshold, at 0.80, indicating
no issue of multicollinearity13 among explanatory and control variables.
Insert Table 7 about here
Table 8 reports the regression results for Equation 1. The fixed effect ordered logic regression
results without and with control variables are presented in Model (1) and (2) respectively.
Model (3) uses the regression results of Equation 1 based on an alternative estimation
technique, the Poisson regression. From the corporate financial performance variables in Model
(2), we found that companies generating high profitability (ROA: β = 0.121, p < 0.01) are
significantly positively associated with materiality assessment disclosure score. We fail to find
any association between market-to-book ratio (MTB: β = 0.0979, p > 0.10) and materiality
assessment disclosure scores, indicating corporate market performance does not correlate with
materiality assessment disclosures14. Overall, these results provide partial support to H1 - that

13

Multicollinearity refers when two or more explanatory variables in multiple regression are highly correlated
with each other. In such cases i.e. presence of multicollinearity, the result showing the effect of explanatory
variables on dependent variables will be biased.
14
We have also used an alternative measure of corporate market performance, i.e. Tobin-Q. Following Jain and
Zaman, (2020), we measured Tobin-Q as Market value of equity + book value of equity – deferred tax / book
value of assets. The statistically insignificant result of Tobin-Q confirms our earlier conjecture that market
performance does not matters in terms of Materiality Assessment Disclosure Score (results available upon
request).
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better corporate financial performance (i.e. Return on Assets) influences the extent of
materiality assessment disclosure amongst GCC listed companies. This may indicate a
reduction in instances of managerial capture which then increases the extent of materiality
assessment disclosures. In terms of H2, we find that corporate leverage is significantly
negatively (Leverage: β = -0.755, p < 0.01) associated with materiality assessment disclosure
scores. These results suggest the possibility of the presence of managerial capture and suggest
that managers in companies with higher gearing publish low-quality sustainability reports that
avoid materiality assessment disclosure. From the corporate governance perspective, our
results show that more independent directors on corporate boards are significantly and
positively (Board independence: β = 0.0434, p < 0.01) related to materiality assessment
disclosure scores. These results suggest that independent directors are effective in monitoring
management and may also keep a check on managerial capture – which potentially increases
the extent of materiality assessment disclosures. We also find that the overall corporate
governance quality is significantly and positively (Governance Quality: β = 0.0586, p < 0.01)
associated with materiality assessment disclosure scores. Taken together, these results provide
strong support to H3 and indicate that companies with better corporate governance are more
transparent potentially indicating lower levels of managerial capture. For H4, we fail to find
any support. Our result shows that company size does not (Company size: β = 0.0144, p > 0.10)
influence the extent of materiality assessment disclosures. In contrast to our hypothesized
contentions, this finding is consistent with prior studies that found no relationship between
company size and the extent and quality of sustainability reporting (Ettredge et al., 2011;
Vormedal & Ruud, 2009).
Insert Table 8 about here
From the perspective of our control variables, the results show that companies in countries with
a high voice and accountability score are significantly positively associated (Voice and
Accountability Index: β = 0.0127, p < 0.05) with the extent of materiality assessment
disclosures. This finding implies countries with secretive societies are characterised by
relatively weaker corporate governance mechanisms which result in a lack of transparency and
poor materiality assessment disclosures. We also found that companies based in high GDP
economies (ln.GDP) are significantly negatively associated (ln.GDP: β = -2.612, p < 0.01) with
the extent of materiality assessment disclosures. This is likely to be because GCC economies
are heavily dependent on the oil and gas companies for their GDP. This is in line with our
earlier analysis for the industry levels that depicts a large portion of environmentally sensitive
industries exhibits low sustainability reporting. We also find no association of regulatory
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quality and GDP growth with materiality assessment disclosures which highlights the
complexities of the GCC economies in relation to transparency and corporate accountability
and needs further scholarly attention.
We also test the robustness of these results by using an alternative estimation technique, the
Poisson regression. The Poisson regression results presented in the Model (3) are qualitatively
similar to our fixed effect ordered logit model.
6.

Discussion

This study attempts to answer two research questions: (i) what is the extent of material
assessment disclosures and (ii) what corporate characteristics (including corporate financial
performance, corporate leverage, corporate governance and company size) influence
materiality assessment disclosures scores? To answer these research questions, a content
analysis of sustainability reports over the five years from 2013 and 2017 was carried out to
evaluate the extent of materiality assessment disclosures. The determinants of materiality
assessment disclosure were examined using regression analysis.
Our findings reveal that sustainability reporting rates have improved in the GCC region,
increasing from 25% in 2013 to 40% in 2017. The improvement in disclosure rates can be
attributed to the efforts of the GCC states toward transitioning to a more sustainable growth
path. These efforts are in line with the recommendations of international institutions such as
the World Bank and United Nations which have encouraged the GCC states to prioritise
sustainable development and reduce their dependency on hydrocarbon revenues at a time
declining energy prices (Barbuscia & Khalid, 2019). However, we note that more effort is
required as 60% (in 2017) of listed companies do not provide their stakeholders with
information on their sustainability performance. These findings are in line with the KPMG
survey (KPMG, 2017, p. 11) which found sustainability reporting rates are “traditionally low.”
The failure of a majority of companies to publish a sustainability report is a potential indication
of the presence of managerial capture which requires government attention.
At a country level, listed companies in Qatar led the GCC with 52% of listed companies
engaged in sustainability reporting while listed companies in Oman lagged, with only 34%
providing their stakeholders with information on their sustainability performance. This is of
concern as Oman’s economy “is particularly vulnerable to oil price swings” (Barbuscia &
Khalid, 2019). In comparison, Qatar’s higher score can be attributed to the Qatari government’s
initiatives and its active participation in the Kyoto Protocol (Raouf, 2008).
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At an industry level, the highest sustainability reporting rates were found among listed
companies operating in the transportation and public utilities industry (an average of 59% over
the sample period) while the lowest disclosure rates were observed in mining companies (12%).
Further, 21% of companies operating in environmentally sensitive industries such as
manufacturing, construction and mining, provide stakeholders information on their
sustainability performance over the five-year period of analysis. These figures are well below
the global average reported in the KPMG 2017 survey which found that 76% of
environmentally sensitive industries15 engaged in sustainability reporting. The low disclosure
rates in the environmentally sensitive sectors are surprising given that a significant body of
sustainability reporting literature is convinced that companies with a high environmental
footprint are more likely to disclose information on their sustainability performance (Haufler,
2010; Mirza & Zimmer, 2001). These findings potentially indicate that managers in these
companies take advantage of voluntary reporting and avoid corporate accountability. In terms
of GRI adoption rates amongst sustainability reporters, the study finds that these have declined
from 11.9% in 2013 to 8.2% in 2017. In comparison, global GRI adoption is approximately
89% in the world’s largest 250 companies and 74% amongst the top 100 companies from a
sample of 49 countries (KPMG, 2017). These findings indicate that managers in listed GCC
companies are not following the requirements of internationally recognised standards as doing
so restricts managers’ ability to control the reporting agenda, giving rise to an increased
likelihood of. managerial capture.
In terms of materiality assessment disclosure rates, the study finds that the number of
sustainability reports offering stakeholders information on how the reporter undertook the
materiality assessment declined from 10.2% of published sustainability reports in 2013 to 8.6%
in 2017. The decline can be attributed to a reduction in GRI adoption rates in the region. At a
country level, in 2017 the materiality assessment disclosure rates were the highest in Qatar,
which leads the GCC in terms of GRI adoption rates. In comparison, the lowest materiality
assessment disclosure rates in 2017 were observed in Kuwait which also has experienced the
most significant decline in GRI adoption rates in the GCC, from 10.7% in 2013 to 3.1% in
2017. These results confirm the presence of managerial capture, as a decline in the adoption of
internationally recognised standards leads to a decline in materiality assessment disclosures.
In terms of materiality assessment disclosure scores, the study indicates that the average scores
for the GCC region have improved, moving from 2.39 in 2013 to 3.08 in 2017. These results

15

From the KPMG (2017) survey we group oil and gas, chemicals, mining, automotive, construction and
materials, and industrials, manufacturing and metals into one cluster for ease of comparison.
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are interesting because we see a decline in the number of sustainability reports that provide
information on the reporters' materiality assessment whilst simultaneously finding that of the
reporters that do provide their stakeholders with information on their materiality assessment,
there is an improvement in the quality of such disclosures, witnessed by an increase in
materiality assessment disclosures scores. These results motivate our second research question:
what corporate characteristics influence materiality assessment disclosures scores? These
corporate characteristics include corporate financial performance, corporate leverage,
corporate governance and size and are based on the sustainability reporting quality literature
(Hahn & Kühnen, 2013).
In terms of financial performance, profitable (i.e. high Return on Assets) companies may have
access to greater financial resources necessary to support the publication of high-quality
sustainability reports. Further, profitable companies are usually characterised by better
management practices and have less need for undertaking managerial capture (Baker, 2010).
In terms of the market-to-book ratio, we do not find any association between market-to-book
ratio and materiality assessment disclosure scores. Overall, these results suggest that corporate
financial performance partially influences materiality assessment disclosure scores. These
findings are in line with prior studies which suggest that heterogeneity in corporate financial
performance leads to divergent organisational outcomes (Jain and Zaman, 2020).
In terms of corporate leverage, the negative association between corporate leverage and
materiality assessment disclosure scores suggests that companies with high leverage are
financially burdened and cannot afford the cost of preparing high-quality sustainability reports
or the reputational and legal costs associated with disclosing potentially damaging information.
These results contrast to studies that argue that companies with higher gearing levels are likely
to disclose higher quality results (Clarkson et al., 2008). We find that strong corporate
governance (including the presence of independent directors on boards) are effective in
monitoring managers and reducing the negative impact of managerial capture.
Finally, we do not find any association between company size and materiality assessment
disclosure scores. These findings are in line with the extant literature which finds no
relationship between company size and sustainability reporting quality (Ettredge et al., 2011;
Vormedal & Ruud, 2009).
7.

Conclusion

Sustainability reports are often criticised for not providing stakeholders with information on
material issues (i.e. sustainability reporting suffers from managerial capture). One solution,
advocated by standard setters (such as the GRI), practitioners (KPMG, 2013) and scholars (De
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Villiers et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2016), is for reporters to provide their readers with information
on how they undertake a how materiality assessment – how are issues and topics identified or
for inclusion in their sustainability reports . This information would allow users to understand
the reporter’s process and why some issues are reported on while others are excluded, using a
materiality matrix. Additionally, users can evaluate the materiality assessment by comparing it
against the requirements of internationally recognised standards, such as the GRI. This would
promote greater confidence in sustainability reports among users.
It is also important to understand what corporate characteristics influence materiality
assessment disclosures amongst reporting entities. However, there remains a dearth of studies
examining materiality in sustainability reporting (Beske et al., 2020; Unerman & Zappettini,
2014). Further, despite the geopolitical significance of the GCC, the region has received little
academic attention (Gerged et al., 2018).
Sustainability reporting rates have improved across the sample period (25% in 2013 to 40% in
2017), though 60% of listed GCC companies do not engage in sustainability reporting. The use
of internationally recognised standards has also declined with only 8.2% of sustainability
reports in 2017 referring to internationally recognised standards, compared to 11.9% 2013.
While materiality assessment disclosures have improved (2.39 in 2013 to 3.08 in 2017), the
number of sustainability reports that offer information on how the reporter identifies material
issues has declined (10.2% in 2013 to 8.6% in 2017). Thus, materiality assessment disclosure
practice varies, with some reporters offering users comprehensive information on their
materiality assessment while others provide little (or in some instances no) information on how
this was done. By failing to provide information on their materiality assessment, reporters are
able to avoid stakeholder scrutiny over their underlying reporting processes and can maintain
their control over the sustainability reporting agenda, and the potential for managerial capture
persists. These findings extend Michelon et al., (2015) who note the symbolic use of
sustainability reporting by companies and express scepticism that such practices are subject to
managerial capture and fail to promote transparency and corporate accountability. Further, the
study finds that materiality assessment disclosure scores are positively influenced by better
corporate governance, lower corporate leverage and higher financial performance (i.e. higher
Return on Assets). However, we find that company size and market-to-book ratio does not
influence materiality assessment disclosure scores.
7.1

Contributions

At an academic level, the contributions from the study are twofold. First, the study addresses
the call for greater research examining materiality in sustainability reporting and contributes to
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the limited literature in this area (Beske et al., 2020; Unerman & Zappettini, 2014). Scholars
have attributed the inconclusive findings of corporate sustainability disclosure and
performance nexus to the lack of consideration of materiality disclosures (see, Khan et al.,
2016) and hence there is a need for greater research in this area to contribute to the literature.
Our study fulfils this gap and brings novel insights from a managerial capture lens.
Surprisingly, despite its relevance, this lens has not been widely used in the sustainability
reporting literature (see, Hahn and Kuhnen, 2013). Improvements in the quality of materiality
assessment disclosures have the potential to promote transparency and corporate
accountability. Furthermore, the study offers useful insights into the sustainability reporting
practices of companies based in high GDP economies generally and the GCC more specifically
(Amran & Haniffa, 2011; Beske et al., 2020; Gerged et al., 2018). In this way, the study
contributes to the limited existing literature examining a region that carries significant social,
political and economic importance. Further, the GCC states have expressed a commitment to
sustainable development and academic research can assist practitioners, reporters and
regulators in improving the quality of their sustainability reporting. The study is novel in the
sense that it captures the materiality assessment disclosure score of companies in a highly
under-research region, the GCC, and also identifies and empirically tests corporate-level
antecedents of materiality assessments. Further, academic attention to sustainability reporting
rates in developing countries is useful as these countries are in the early stages of their
sustainability reporting journey and variations in practice are more likely.
At a practical level, the findings may prove useful to practitioners (including sustainability
reporting managers and sustainability assurance providers) with regard to what constitutes best
practice in sustainability reporting. Sustainability reporting managers are encouraged to
provide comprehensive disclosure over their materiality assessments. The examples provided
in this study will assist managers in this respect. Further, such disclosures should be included
in the scope of sustainability assurance engagements (Farooq & De Villiers, 2019a) and
sustainability assurance providers can use the examples of materiality assessment disclosures
when evaluating corporate materiality assessment disclosures. Thus, regulators are encouraged
to introduce tougher regulations around materiality assessment disclosures in sustainability
reporting and sustainability assurance. Further, stock exchange regulators should introduce
tougher corporate governance requirements around board structure (i.e. independent directors)
and sustainability reporting standards (i.e. the use of internationally recognised sustainability
reporting standards, e.g. GRI standards) as our results show that these variables lead to higher
materiality assessment disclosure scores (results available upon request). Therefore, regulators
should consider including these recommendations as part of corporate listing requirements.
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Finally, the societal implications of these recommendations are improved sustainability
reporting quality, specifically better materiality assessment disclosures, which can lead to
transparency and corporate accountability. Such changes have the potential to further the
sustainability agenda and support the GCC states’ desire to implement the UN SDGs and
transition to sustainable development.
7.2 Limitations and future research
The low reporting rates, low adoption of the GRI and poor materiality assessment disclosures
indicate a need for greater research into the sustainability reporting practices of organisations
(private and public, large listed and smaller non-listed) in developing countries, especially
those located in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. It is particularly worth exploring the
institutional and cultural inhibitors that are causing a decline in sustainability reporting rates,
the adoption of international standards such as the GRI, and the materiality assessment
disclosures. Future studies should involve comparing reporters’ claims on how the materiality
assessment was performed against how the assessment was carried out, using either survey or
case study research methods. Researchers should also consider materiality assessment
disclosures offered in other media, such as reporters’ websites. This study is limited to the
examination of reporters’ materiality assessment disclosures - how they conducted their
materiality assessments - by developing a scoring index broadly based on the GRI index.
However, considering the significance of International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC)
and Sustainability Accounting Standard Board (SASB) literature in materiality determination,
it is recommended for future researchers to investigate the peculiarities associated with use of
specific

standards

(e.g.

GRI,

AccountAbility,

2018

AP1100

and

IIRC)

on materiality assessment disclosure quality. This study is limited to the identification and
testing of four determinants of materiality assessment disclosure scores. Future researchers
should consider the impact of other corporate characteristics, such as ownership structure,
media coverage and gender diversity, on the quality of materiality assessment disclosures. As
materiality assessment disclosures can be influenced by investor sentiments, it is recommended
for future researchers to capture the nuances associated with investor sentiments. In addition,
the cost of corporate disclosures varies directly with the quality of their information. Future
researchers should also consider incorporating this variable in their analysis to offer a more
nuanced discussion of corporate reporting behaviour. Finally, there is a need for more
interpretive (qualitative) and case studies, examining the extent of managerial (and
professional) capture in sustainability reporting practices by companies based in the GCC
region. The potential for the materiality assessment in feeding into corporate sustainability
planning and decision making is also worth examining.
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Appendix A1: Examples of materiality assessment disclosures
This section provides examples of materiality assessment disclosures that achieve scores
ranging from one to five:
A1.1

Materiality assessment score 1

An example of a reporter that claims to have conducted a materiality assessment without
providing any disclosure on the materiality assessment is Almarai (KSA) who, in its 2017
annual report, states:
“We aim to disclose our performance against our sustainability goals in a dedicated
Sustainability Report that will cover 2017 and appear in 2018. We made progress in
applying the materiality assessment process to identify issues that reflect Almarai’s
significant economic, environmental and social impacts, or those that most influence
the assessments and views of our stakeholders. This continuous materiality assessment
is helping us focus on the sustainability issues that matter most and identify the critical
issues we need to manage. Assessment of materiality will allow us to develop a strategic
sustainability programme, with a clear road map and goals. Materiality will be the
anchor of our sustainability strategy as we move forward” (Almarai, Annual Report,
2017, pg 44).
Other than the information quoted above, the reporter provides no discussion on how the
materiality assessment was undertaken or how (in terms of criteria used) it prioritised issues
through a materiality matrix.
It was found that in some cases, reporters will undertake materiality assessment in one reporting
period and then use the results of that assessment in driving the content of multiple subsequent
reports. One example is Sabic (KSA) which refers to its 2013 materiality assessment for
sustainability reports published in 2014, 2015 and 2017 (no sustainability report was published
in 2016). This approach to disclosing information on the materiality assessment creates two
issues. First, there arises a question of the frequency with which reporters undertake a
materiality assessment (e.g. every year versus every five years) and how frequently they should
be undertaking their materiality assessment. The challenge for regulators and standard setters
is that each reporter is unique, and while some reporters may experience rapid internal or
external change/s (prompting a fresh materiality assessment), others may find that their
material issues have remained relatively stable. The latter group of reporters must be required
to undertake an annual materiality review aimed at validating the suitability of materiality
assessments undertaken in previous years and to disclose information about how the review
was conducted within each sustainability report.
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Second, reporters must ensure that if they refer to materiality assessments undertaken in
previous reporting periods and choose not to provide information on how this was done in the
current sustainability report, then copies of the old sustainability reports (which contain
information on the materiality assessment) must be available online for stakeholders. For
example, ACWA (Oman), in its 2016 sustainability report states:
“The details of our revised materiality assessment and all other GRI reporting
requirements have been collated into a Sustainability Supplement to enable easy
reference. The Sustainability Supplement is an integral part of this annual performance
report and is available from the Annual Report section of our website,
www.acwapower.com” (ACWA, Sustainability Report, 2016, pg. 14).
When the supplement was examined it was found that it simply contained a table of material
issues without any discussion of how these were identified or on what basis or criteria they
were ranked. Thus, it may be appropriate for reporters to simply reproduce their materiality
assessment disclosures in subsequent reports, if material issues have remained relatively stable.
A1.2

Materiality assessment score 2

An example of a reporter that provides limited disclosure without disclosing a materiality
matrix is Kahramaa (Qatar), which in its 2016 sustainability report gave limited information
on its materiality assessment.
“Identifying material sustainability issues: We engage with our stakeholders on
various sustainability topics on an ongoing basis. In 2014, we have strengthened our
efforts even further. At the beginning of our report development process we have
conducted a formal materiality assessment. Our aims were to initiate the conversation
with our various stakeholder groups around what matters to them and what they would
like to see from KAHRAMAA, and to identify, filter, and prioritize our key
sustainability aspects. In determining and prioritizing these areas, we considered
whether they reflect KAHRAMAA’s most significant economic, environmental and
social impacts, and substantially influence our stakeholders’ assessments and/or
decisions about our organization. The content of this report has been compiled through
discussions with KAHRAMAA’s senior management and decision-makers, as well as
through two materiality workshops - one for internal stakeholders, including
representatives from various departments, and another for our external stakeholder
groups. During these workshops we were able to capture key feedback on our first
sustainability report, and to hear directly from our audiences on their future
expectations from KAHRAMAA. We have reviewed our most material issues already
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identified in the previous report to assess their continuous relevance to both our
organization and the stakeholders. We have also considered the GRI G4 Aspects list
and have benchmarked peers to understand what they considered material and how they
report on these topics” (Kahramaa, Sustainability Report, 2016, pg. 16).
“During the report preparation process, we have specifically engaged a number of
internal and external stakeholders as part of the materiality assessment. Our intent was
to invite their perspectives and recommendations on our report and to hear from them
regarding our most material sustainability aspects. The feedback was positive and our
effort for the first sustainability report was highly appreciated” (Kahramaa,
Sustainability Report, 2016, pg. 17).
The reporter claims to develop a materiality matrix (pg. 4) but does not disclose the materiality
matrix within the sustainability report.
A1.3

Materiality assessment score 3

An example of a reporter that provides limited disclosure along with a materiality matrix is
Tasnee (KSA), which in its 2017 sustainability report states:
“Conducted workshop on “Materiality”. Completed materiality assessment for
identifying top Sustainability issues in TPC via engagement of internal stakeholders &
external expert opinion” (Tasnee, Sustainability Report, 2017, page 5).
“As part of sustainability management program, TASNEE Petrochemical Complex
(TPC) has developed first sustainability materiality assessment by engagement of
internal stakeholders and the external expert opinion that defines & ranks the issues and
topics that have the highest impact on company & stakeholders. On the basis of this
assessment TPC management selected company material topics. TPC have focused on
the majority of topics that fell within the high importance for company and high
importance for Stakeholders. These topics are considered to be the most important to
our business. Sustainability management begins with identifying and defining the
topics and issues that have the most significant impact on company’s operations and
stakeholders” (Tasnee, Sustainability Report, 2017, page 6).
A materiality matrix (p. 6) prioritises issues based on internal stakeholders (x-axis) and external
stakeholders (y-axis) and identifies and prioritises 48 issues.
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A1.4

Materiality assessment score 4

An example of a reporter that provided comprehensive disclosure over its materiality
assessment without providing a materiality matrix is WOQOD (Qatar), which in its 2016
sustainability report outlined a four-step materiality assessment process (identification,
prioritisation, validation and review) in line with the recommendations of the GRI. However,
a materiality matrix is missing from the discussion. Instead, the reporter simply states:
“STEP 2: PRIORITIZATION: After considering a list of relevant topics which will be
covered in the report which are likely to be a list containing a selection of GRI Aspects
and GRI sector disclosures that are complemented, if needed, by other topics, the
organization should prioritize them. This involves considering the significance of their
economic, environmental and social impacts for their substantive influence on the
assessments

and

decisions

through

stakeholder

consultations”

(WOQOD,

Sustainability Report, 2016, pg. 26-27).
This indicates that some reporters are perhaps unwilling to share with their stakeholders: (1)
the issues that they identified through the materiality assessment; and (2) the criteria/basis used
to rank/prioritise issues between material (disclosed) and immaterial (not disclosed).
A1.5

Materiality assessment score 5

An example of a reporter that provides comprehensive disclosure over its materiality
assessment and a materiality matrix is Dolphin Energy (Abu Dhabi), which scored 5 for its
2015 sustainability report. The company adopts the GRI guidelines and presents a four-step
approach to its materiality assessment. A materiality matrix (p. 6) prioritises issues based on
significance to Dolphin Energy (x-axis) and significance to stakeholders (y-axis) and identifies
and prioritises 21 issues into “least material”, “somewhat material” and “very material”
categories.
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Appendix A2: Variables definition
Variables

Description

Source

Materiality Disc.
Score

Materiality assessment disclosure score
captured through content analysis by scoring
materiality assessment disclosures from zero (no
information provided) to five (comprehensive
disclosure in line with the GRI requirement)
(See appendix A1 for detailed construction)
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
Return on assets is the ratio of income before
extraordinary items to total assets.
Market to book ratio.
Percentage of independent director to total
director on board
Governance score takes values from 0 to 100
with the lowest values correspond to low
corporate governance.
Natural log of total asset
World Governance Indicators that captures
perception of the extent to which country’
citizens are able to participate in selecting their
government, as well as freedom of expression,
freedom of association, and a free media
World Governance Indicators that captures
perceptions of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and
regulations that permit and promote private
sector development
Capture growth of county’s economy
The natural logarithm of gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita.

Author’s
compilation

Leverage
ROA
MTB
Board
independence
Governance
Score
Company Size
Voice and
Accountability
Index

Regulatory
Quality

GD Growth
Ln.GDP

Author’s calculation
Author’s calculation
Author’s calculation
Thomson Reuters
Eikon
Thomson Reuter
Eikon
Author’s calculation
World Bank

World Bank

World Bank
World Bank
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Table 1: Sustainability reporting across sample of listed GCC companies
Country
Abu Dhabi
Bahrain
Dubai
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
KSA
Grand Total

2013
18
17
15
28
26
19
54
177

2014
21
21
13
32
30
24
59
200

2015
23
22
19
35
32
24
67
222

2016
22
24
25
63
36
26
73
269

2017
26
23
27
64
39
24
76
279

Grand Total
110
107
99
222
163
117
329
1147

Table 2: Materiality assessment disclosure score
Description
No reference made to a materiality assessment.
The reporter claims to have undertaken a materiality assessment but provides
no information on the steps adopted.
Limited information provided on the steps of the materiality assessment.
However, no materiality matrix is provided to sustainability report users.
Limited information provided on the steps of the materiality assessment and a
materiality matrix is provided.
Comprehensive disclosure provided on the steps of the materiality assessment.
However, no materiality matrix is provided.
Comprehensive disclosure provided on the steps of the materiality assessment
and a materiality matrix is provided.

Score
0
1
2
3
4
5
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Table 3: Sustainability reporters across countries
Listed Company
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Abu Dhabi
70
18
26%
21
30%
23
33%
22
31%
26
37%
Bahrain
44
17
39%
21
48%
22
50%
24
55%
23
52%
Dubai
76
15
20%
13
17%
19
25%
25
33%
27
36%
Kuwait
176
28
16%
32
18%
35
20%
63
36%
64
36%
Oman
116
26
22%
30
26%
32
28%
36
31%
39
34%
Qatar
46
19
41%
24
52%
24
52%
26
57%
24
52%
KSA
176
54
31%
59
34%
67
38%
73
41%
76
43%
Grand Total
704
177
200
222
269
279
Note: This Table provides an assessment of ‘Sustainability Reporters’ among GCC countries. ‘Sustainability Reporters’ (SR) assessment, is based
on a dichotomous scale; i.e. ‘1’, if a company discloses sustainability-related information in its annual reports or standalone sustainability reports
and ‘0’ otherwise.

Table 4: Sustainability reporters across industries
Listed Firms
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Construction
7
1 14%
1 14%
2 29%
2 29%
2 29%
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
354
98 28%
103 29%
115 32%
145 41%
147 42%
Manufacturing
209
40 19%
50 24%
54 26%
68 33%
75 36%
Mining
19
1 5%
1 5%
1 5%
3 16%
5 26%
Retail Trade
6
0 0%
0 0%
1 17%
2 33%
1 17%
Services
80
20 25%
30 38%
32 40%
31 39%
30 38%
Transportation & Public Utilities
29
17 59%
15 52%
17 59%
18 62%
19 66%
Grand Total
704
177 25%
200 28%
222 32%
269 38%
279 40%
Note: This Table provides an industry wise assessment of ‘Sustainability Reporters’ among GCC countries. ‘Sustainability Reporters’ (SR)
assessment, is based on a dichotomous scale; i.e. ‘1’, if a company discloses sustainability-related information in its annual reports or standalone
sustainability reports and ‘0’ otherwise.
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Table 5: Overview of GRI and Materiality Assessment Disclosure

Abu Dhabi
Bahrain
Dubai
Kuwait
Muscat
Qatar
KSA
Total

Abu Dhabi
Bahrain
Dubai
Kuwait
Muscat
Qatar
KSA
Total

2013
2014
2015

Abu Dhabi
Bahrain
Dubai
Kuwait
Muscat
Qatar
KSA
Total

2016

Abu Dhabi
Bahrain
Dubai
Kuwait
Muscat
Qatar
KSA
Total

Panel A: GRI
Adoption
Rates
Year SR GRI GRI %
18
5
27.8%
17
1
5.9%
15
3
20.0%
28
3
10.7%
26
4
15.4%
19
2
10.5%
54
3
5.6%
177 21
11.9%
Panel A: GRI
Adoption
Rates
21
4
19.0%
21
1
4.8%
13
2
15.4%
32
2
6.3%
30
4
13.3%
24
5
20.8%
59
4
6.8%
200 22
11.0%
Panel A: GRI
Adoption
Rates
23
2
8.7%
22
1
4.5%
19
3
15.8%
35
2
5.7%
32
5
15.6%
24
4
16.7%
67
4
6.0%
222 21
9.5%
Panel A: GRI
Adoption
Rates
22
4
18.2%
24
2
8.3%
25
3
12.0%
63
4
6.3%
36
3
8.3%
26
4
15.4%
73
4
5.5%
269 24
8.9%

Panel B: Materiality Panel C: Materiality
assessment Rates
assessment
disclosure scores
MAD1 MAD %
MAS
Avg.MAS
3
16.7%
7
2.33
1
5.9%
2
2.00
3
20.0%
7
2.33
2
7.1%
5
2.50
4
15.4%
10
2.50
1
5.3%
2
2.00
4
7.4%
10
2.50
18
10.2%
43
2.39
Panel B: Materiality Panel C: Materiality
assessment Rates
assessment
disclosure scores
3
14.3%
11
3.67
1
4.8%
3
3.00
2
15.4%
5
2.50
1
3.1%
3
3.00
4
13.3%
12
3.00
3
12.5%
9
3.00
3
5.1%
8
2.67
17
8.5%
51
3.00
Panel B: Materiality Panel C: Materiality
assessment Rates
assessment
disclosure scores
2
8.7%
5
2.50
1
4.5%
3
3.00
3
15.8%
9
3.00
2
5.7%
4
2.00
5
15.6%
15
3.00
3
12.5%
7
2.33
4
6.0%
9
2.25
20
9.0%
52
2.60
Panel B: Materiality Panel C: Materiality
assessment Rates
assessment
disclosure scores
3
13.6%
12
4.00
2
8.3%
6
3.00
3
12.0%
7
2.33
4
6.3%
7
1.75
3
8.3%
9
3.00
3
11.5%
12
4.00
3
4.1%
7
2.33
21
7.8%
60
2.86
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2017

Abu Dhabi
Bahrain
Dubai
Kuwait
Muscat
Qatar
KSA
Total

Panel A: GRI
Adoption
Rates
26
3
11.5%
23
2
8.7%
27
3
11.1%
64
2
3.1%
39
3
7.7%
24
4
16.7%
76
6
7.9%
279 23
8.2%

Panel B: Materiality Panel C: Materiality
assessment Rates
assessment
disclosure scores
3
11.5%
13
4.33
2
8.7%
6
3.00
3
11.1%
8
2.67
2
3.1%
6
3.00
3
7.7%
13
4.33
3
12.5%
11
3.67
8
10.5%
17
2.50
24
8.6%
74
3.08

Note: This table provides a summary of the GRI adoption rates, Materiality assessment
disclosure rate and Materiality assessment disclosure scores among sustainability reporters
over the five-year period of analysis. Panel A: shows the SR column provides the sum of
sustainability reports, the GRI column indicates the sum of the GRI adoption rates, and the
% column shows the percentage of companies following GRI among sustainability reporters.
Note that the GRI adoption rates are based on a dichotomous scale; i.e. ‘1’ if the sustainability
report provides reference to the GRI and ‘0’ otherwise. Panel B provides a summary of
materiality assessment disclosure (MAD) rates among sustainability reporters over the fiveyear period of analysis. The MAD column indicates the sum of materiality assessment
disclosures identified in sustainability reports, and the % column shows the percentage of
sustainability reports providing some information on materiality assessment. The MAD is
based on a dichotomous scale; i.e. ‘1’, if a sustainability report provides some information
on the materiality assessment and ‘0’ otherwise. Panel C provides a summary of the
materiality assessment (MA) scores for sustainability reporters over the five-year period of
analysis. The MAS column provides the sum of MA scores, and the Avg.MAS column shows
the average materiality assessment score. The MAS is calculated based on the materiality
assessment disclosure scores (Table 2).
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Materiality Disc. Score
Leverage
ROA
MTB
Company size
Board independence
CG Quality
Voice & Accountability Index
Regulatory Quality
GDP growth
Ln GDP

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

1.486
0.627
0.129
1.660
22.521
23.074
61.886
15.456
68.037
2.940
11.396

1.600
1.078
0.325
1.240
2.289
29.025
20.016
7.670
11.12
1.939
0.398

0.000
-6.500
-0.065
0.261
15.226
0.000
16.000
2.817
48.558
-4.70
10.493

5
5.125
2.364
11.786
26.581
100
93.853
30.542
82.692
5.4
11.879

Note: This Table provide the descriptive statistics of study variables.
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Table 7: Pairwise correlations
Variables
(1) Leverage
(2) ROA
(3) MTB
(4) Company size
(5) B.IND
(6) CG Quality
(7) Voice & Accountability
(8) Regulatory Quality
(9) GDP growth
(10) ln GDP

(1)
1.000
-0.015
0.074
0.009
-0.046
0.159*
-0.121*
-0.052
0.014
0.076

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

1.000
0.105
0.276***
0.044
-0.010
-0.252***
-0.192**
-0.056
0.191**

1.000
0.314***
0.055
-0.025
-0.066
-0.038
-0.072
0.185**

1.000
0.169**
0.021
-0.345***
-0.131*
-0.068
0.663***

1.000
0.360***
-0.250***
-0.041
0.056
-0.053

1.000
-0.204**
-0.306***
-0.231**
0.159*

1.000
0.428*** 1.000
-0.065
0.407*** 1.000
-0.506*** -0.225*** -0.053 1.000

Note: This table shows pairwise correlation matrix between proxies of variables. ***, **, * shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
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Table 8: Regression results of corporate characteristics and materiality assessment
disclosure
Fixed Effect Ordered Logic

Poisson
Regression
Variables
DV: Materiality assessment disclosure Score
(1)
(2)
(3)
Leverage
-0.605**
-0.755***
-0.199**
(0.281)
(0.284)
(0.0783)
ROA
0.080**
0.121***
0.246**
(0.037)
(0.0430)
(0.124)
MTB
-0.050
0.0979
0.000515
(0.374)
(0.407)
(0.00223)
Company size
0.082
0.144
-0.0465
(0.164)
(0.220)
(0.0769)
Board independence
0.014
0.0434***
0.00963**
(0.010)
(0.0160)
(0.00427)
Governance Quality
0.035***
0.0586***
0.0142***
(0.013)
(0.0181)
(0.00542)
Voice and Accountability Index
0.127**
0.0368**
(0.0598)
(0.0176)
Regulatory Quality
0.0370
0.0247
(0.0296)
(0.0169)
GDP growth
0.128
0.00625
(0.146)
(0.0467)
Ln GDP
-2.612**
-0.555*
(1.211)
(0.317)
Constant
-3.374
23.19*
6.355*
(3.692)
(12.84)
(3.474)
F-stat p-value
0.002
0.000
0.006
Year Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Pseudo R2
0.158
0.250
0.056
Observations
100
100
100
Note: This table presents the regression result of Materiality assessment disclosure Score and
Corporate Characteristics using fixed effect Fixed Effect Ordered Logic and Poisson
Regression estimation approach. Industry and years control are included in all estimation. The
robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * show significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% level.
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